@ f98307e213f9f3c11b00c8edc3c367c315b9819a | history
package lisp2gov
import (
"bytes"
"crypto/ed25519"
"crypto/rand"
"crypto/sha256"
"crypto/x509"
"crypto/x509/pkix"
"encoding/pem"
"fmt"
"math/big"
"time"
)
// The default window in force. 9999-12-31 is RFC 5280's value for a
// certificate with no well-defined expiration.
var (
defaultEffective = time.Date(2000, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, time.UTC)
defaultExpires = time.Date(9999, 12, 31, 23, 59, 59, 0, time.UTC)
)
// signer is a certificate together with the key that signs the next one.
type signer struct {
cert *x509.Certificate
key ed25519.PrivateKey
}
// newAnchor makes the self-signed trust anchor. It carries no policies:
// the policy tree starts below it, at cert 1.
func newAnchor(seed [32]byte, program string) (signer, error) {
key := keyForDepth(seed, 0)
pub := key.Public().(ed25519.PublicKey)
tmpl := &x509.Certificate{
SerialNumber: big.NewInt(1),
Subject: pkix.Name{CommonName: "GOVERNMENT Anchor", Organization: []string{program}},
NotBefore: defaultEffective,
NotAfter: defaultExpires,
BasicConstraintsValid: true,
IsCA: true,
KeyUsage: x509.KeyUsageCertSign | x509.KeyUsageCRLSign,
SubjectKeyId: keyID(pub),
AuthorityKeyId: keyID(pub),
}
return create(tmpl, tmpl, pub, key, key)
}
// newCert makes the cert at depth i, issued by parent. Every cert but the
// last is a CA, because each one signs the next; the last one signs
// nothing.
func newCert(seed [32]byte, program string, i int, last bool, policies []x509.OID, mappings []x509.PolicyMapping, parent signer) (signer, error) {
key := keyForDepth(seed, i)
pub := key.Public().(ed25519.PublicKey)
tmpl := &x509.Certificate{
SerialNumber: big.NewInt(int64(i + 1)),
Subject: pkix.Name{CommonName: fmt.Sprintf("GOVERNMENT Depth %d", i), Organization: []string{program}},
NotBefore: defaultEffective,
NotAfter: defaultExpires,
BasicConstraintsValid: true,
IsCA: !last,
KeyUsage: x509.KeyUsageCertSign | x509.KeyUsageCRLSign,
SubjectKeyId: keyID(pub),
}
if last {
tmpl.KeyUsage = x509.KeyUsageDigitalSignature
}
if last && len(mappings) > 0 {
// RFC 5280 never processes mappings in the last cert (6.1.4 runs
// only for certs 1..n-1), so any here would be silently dead.
return signer{}, fmt.Errorf("cert %d is the last one and cannot carry mappings", i)
}
if len(policies) > 0 {
infos := make([]policyInfo, len(policies))
for j, p := range policies {
infos[j] = policyInfo{id: p}
}
ext, err := certificatePoliciesExtension(infos)
if err != nil {
return signer{}, err
}
tmpl.ExtraExtensions = append(tmpl.ExtraExtensions, ext)
}
if len(mappings) > 0 {
ext, err := policyMappingsExtension(mappings)
if err != nil {
return signer{}, err
}
tmpl.ExtraExtensions = append(tmpl.ExtraExtensions, ext)
}
return create(tmpl, parent.cert, pub, parent.key, key)
}
func create(tmpl, parent *x509.Certificate, pub ed25519.PublicKey, signWith, own ed25519.PrivateKey) (signer, error) {
// Ed25519 signatures use no randomness, and the serial is set, so rand
// is never read and the output is deterministic.
der, err := x509.CreateCertificate(rand.Reader, tmpl, parent, pub, signWith)
if err != nil {
return signer{}, err
}
cert, err := x509.ParseCertificate(der)
if err != nil {
return signer{}, err
}
return signer{cert, own}, nil
}
// keyID is RFC 7093 method 1: the leftmost 160 bits of the SHA-256 of the
// public key. Go would compute a key id for CA certs on its own, but not for
// the last cert, and its choice of hash has changed between releases;
// setting it here keeps every cert's bytes the same across Go versions.
func keyID(pub ed25519.PublicKey) []byte {
sum := sha256.Sum256(pub)
return sum[:20]
}
func encodePEM(header string, certs []*x509.Certificate) []byte {
var b bytes.Buffer
b.WriteString(header)
for _, c := range certs {
pem.Encode(&b, &pem.Block{Type: "CERTIFICATE", Bytes: c.Raw})
}
return b.Bytes()
}